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This paper analyzes the identity of the tea factory as relating to small-
holder tea farmers in eastern Nepal as well as the effects of a tea factory’s 
conversion to organic production on the bargaining power of tea farmers. This 
research uses both primary and secondary sources, including but not limited to 
interviews with tea farmers in the Sundarpani area of the Ilam district of eastern 
Nepal as well as interviews with staff members of Gorkha Tea Estate in the same 
area. The research findings indicate that though tea factories in the eastern hill 
region of Nepal act as efficient, expert middlemen which sustain the existence of 
small-holder, export tea farmers, the conversion to organic production and 
necessary sublicensing of member farmers gives the factory monopsonistic 
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This study evaluates the bargaining power of different players in the 
production of Nepali orthodox tea as conducted by small-holder farmers selling 
to tea factories. Further, it considers a factory’s conversion to organic and the 
conversion’s effects on the bargaining power of farmers who agree to a organic 
sublicense relationship. More specifically, it considers the effects of such a 
conversion by Gorkha Tea Estate on its relationship with its member farmers in 
Sundarpani, Nepal.  
 
Nepal’s Tea Sector 
Orthodox tea is the primary product of  the hill regions of eastern Nepal 
(Ilam, Panchthar,Terahthum and Dhankutt).  This tea is produced in the older, 
traditional style, keeping the tea leaves whole, as opposed to the less expensive, 
Terai-grown Crush Tear Curl (CTC) tea. While CTC tea is grown mostly by large 
tea estates, the vast majority of orthodox tea is grown by small holder farmers. 
(Sharma 2006) Eastern Nepal has a very good climate for tea production, uses 
Chinese and clone seed varieties, and has young bushes. This area is therefore in 
a good position to produce high quality tea, but lacks an established market.  
 Over 90% of Nepal’s tea produced in the Eastern hill region is produced 
by small-holder farmers, rather than plantations as is the case in neighboring 
Darjeeling. (Rai, Sunil 2011) Harwood presents a theory of development that 
emphasizes the small farm as a keystone to sustainable and stable 
societies.(1979) Literature on larger tea estates in Nepal’s Terai region illuminate 
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growing issues of child labor, exploitation, and feudal economic systems, as 
opposed to small-holder farms which tend to have higher costs and less access to 
markets, but higher cultural sustainability and fewer social concerns. (Sainju 
1991, Sharma 2006)  
 In order to address the lack of market access by these small-holder 
farmers, several supports and institutions are involved with Nepal’s tea sector 
attempting to standardize and assist with marketing of tea in Nepal.  The 
Himalayan Tea Producers Cooperative Limited (HIMCOOP) was established by 
local farmers and executives in Nepal’s eastern hill-region tea sector in 2003. 
HIMCOOP’s website presents the cooperative’s intent to market tea which is 
“helping to make thousands of small farmers economically and socially viable”. 
Similarly, Tea Sector Service Center, Nepal (TEASEC) was established to address 
growing problems addressed by small-holder tea farmers in the eastern hills of 
Nepal. A service center providing assistance with technical needs of farmers in 
relation to cultivation, production, manufacturing, and marketing, TEASEC’s 
website explains its overall mission as providing “service to the small growers 
and enterprises to produce high quality tea and to generate sustainable 
incomes.” TEASEC and HIMCOOP are working to promote professionalism, 
quality, and organization within small-holder tea farms in Eastern Nepal to 
compete more vigorously in the tea export market.  
 
Gorkha Tea Estate 
 There are 92 tea factories in Nepal, but very few of these factories have 
their own tea garden, so most green leaf (unprocessed tea leaves) is bought from 
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farmers in the area either directly or through cooperatives or groups. 
(Chapagain 2011)  Gorkha Tea Estate is a tea factory located in Sundarpani near 
the town of Fikkal in the Ilam district of Eastern Nepal. The tea factory works 
with four cooperatives (Eco Tea Producers, Sundarpani Tea Cooperative, Shree 
Antu Organic Tea Group, and Shree Boudadhan Tea Cooperative) together 
contributing a total of 222 member farmers. The current price offered to farmers 
is 55 Nepali rupees per kilo of green leaf. In 1997 the factory began converting to 
organic production and is hoping to be certified by the Institute for 
Marketecology (IMO) this June. (Chapagain 2011) Certification has involved the 
conversion to organic farming and sublicense of Gorkha Tea Estates member 
farmers. A sublicense is the practice in which a farmer is licensed as an organic 
producer under Gorkha Tea Estate and sells all green leaf to the estate, which 
then processes organic certified tea. The decision to convert to organic occurred 
in negotiations between the factory and its cooperatives as well as the cooperative 
and its farmers. The factory offers technical support to the farmers who have 
chosen to convert to organic. The Gorkha Tea Estate has only one buyer, Tee 
Schwender from Germany, who sells in stores all over Europe as well as in the 
US. The factory, Tee Schwender, and GIZ (a Dutch NGO) have formed Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) with the vision of producing and marketing high 








 Classical economic theory explains that natural market mechanisms, 
though not creating worldwide equality, should create no disadvantage to any 
trading party. According to Ricardo’s Law of Comparative Advantage, if each 
country, region, or person specializes in what is comparatively produced most 
efficiently, then output is optimized with existing resources and each participant 
will be equally well off if not better off than they would be without specialization 
and trade. (Brown 1993) However, as is clear by the continual existence of 
political and social movements against current international trade policies, a great 
number of people do not see Ricardo’s Law as effectual in reality.  
 One example of market realities that do not conform to classic economic 
models is the differences between the bargaining positions of manufactures and 
the position of primary producers. (Brown 1993) Food products, as often 
perishable items, usually cannot be withheld from the market to control price 
stability as manufactured goods can. Also, producers in developing countries 
often do not have facilities for processing, packaging, and storing, forcing them 
to use middlemen which, depending on circumstances, can act as efficient market 
players or can hold excessive market power.  Further, since millions of 
households are engaged in primary production rather than the much smaller 
number of manufacturing companies, commodity agreements for market control 
is much more difficult among primary producers. (Brown 1993)  
 
Middlemen 
 Another important aspect of tea in Nepal is the predominant production 
process involving the sale of green leaf by small-holder farmers to tea factories.  
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These tea factories process the tea and act as a middleman between the small-
holder farmers and the export market. Academically, the middleman as an 
economic player is often criticized as holding excessive market power and 
contributing to inefficiency. However, Garella explains that in markets 
experiencing Akerlofian “lemons impasse” in which goods of various quality 
have similar prices, where average quality depends upon market price, and where 
buyers cannot identify quality, that a middleman functions as an efficient trade 
organizer. (Garella 1989) In a continuation of this theory, Biglaiser presents a 
hypothesis showing the middleman to be welfare improving in all equilibria or 
market end-points when adverse selection (buyers and sellers having asymmetric 
information) is present. This is often the case in export goods or wholesale goods 
where the initial production far removed from the eventual product. In this 
proposal he shows the middleman acting as an expert. (Biglaiser 1993) The 
middleman is able to act as an expert because he buys a large quantity of goods, 
unlike the ordinary buyer. He therefore has the incentive to invest in skills which 
increase his ability to detect a good’s quality. The middleman will also be in the 
market for longer and therefore highly values his reputation for selling good-
quality goods. Thus the middleman becomes both better able to detect quality and 
has the incentive to reliably sell quality goods, so if transaction costs are low and 
goods are of varying quality, the middleman’s existence in the market will 
contribute to welfare gains. With such a middleman acting as an expert, goods 
will be both of higher average quality and have a higher  price. (Bigslaiser 1993)  
However, with the use of cartels (cooperation among independent organization to 
limit competition) or other factor limiting competition, a middleman can also be 






The advent of alternative trade movements focused on the ideals of 
responsible consumerism provided new possibilities in combating inequalities in 
trade. The philosophy behind movements such as ‘green’, ‘fair trade’ or ‘organic’ 
rests on the possibility of heightening production transparency through demand 
for products inspected and certified as fitting into certain standards of production. 
Even strong proponents of alternative trade movements such as organic or fair 
trade agree that an individual’s choice will make very little difference in the 
grand scheme of international trade. (Brown 1993) However, seen as a 
movement, such ideas show more promise. In the abstract and extreme outcome 
of a large majority of consumers in the developed world choosing to buy products 
like coffee, tea, and honey, only from organic certified producers, the entire 
market for such goods would change. It is important to consider this theoretical 
extreme as the theory behind alternative trade movements rides on the possibility 
of eventually and slowly changing market incentives and transparency through 
consumer demand. Though these movements cannot claim to be able to 
singularly extinguish the “seemingly downward spiral of problems associated 
with the current neo-liberal globalization regime, which has let to increasing 
impoverishment, disenfranchisement, and alienation on a worldwide scale,” these 
are the very occurrences which the movements stands against and hopes to 
combat through conscious consumer choice. (Murray et al. 2006) 
While recognizing alternative methods of trade’s potential to affect 
development through improved transparency in international trade systems, there 
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are also many critiques of these movements.  Sarah Besky (2008), in researching 
fair trade certification on tea plantations in Darjeeling tackled the question of 
whether a tea plantation, as an inherently hierarchical institution, could, in fact, 
be considered social responsible or ‘fair’. In her research she found that not only 
did certified plantations differ little from other plantations, but that they bent 
words and rules in order to achieve certification seemingly purely for the market 
access and higher price rather than for social equality or conditions. In many 
Darjeeling plantations, fair trade certification led to the dissolution of unions as 
unions were seen as barriers to free trade. In the upholding of neoliberal 
economic theory, the fair trade certifications thus absolved the Indian government 
of responsibility for the protection of workers, arguably working against the very 
goals fair trade aims to support. 
 
Organic Tea 
 Within the tea market, alternative trade in the form of organic tea has 
risen steadily in popularity over the last decade. (Hazra 2006) The impetus for 
this movement arose from growing fears that greater use of synthetic 
agrochemical and other “green revolution” technologies have created 
environmental and health problems.  Organic agriculture is thus seen as an 
alternative and as having the possibility to increase efficiency and sustainability 
of production as well as increasing the value of the agricultural product. Though 
there is no single definition of organic agriculture, the organic movement as a 
whole is seen as based on “holistic management systems which promote and 
enhance agro-ecosystem health, including biodiversity, biological cycles, and 
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soil biological activity.” (Hazra 2006) The International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture’s (IFOAM) definition of the objectives of organic farming can be 
found in Appendix A. In tea specifically, conversion to organic production is 
seen as carrying a high level of risk and uncertainty in relation to financial 
viability. There is also currently a lack of detailed information or instructions 
available to farmers. The first couple of years of the conversion process is seen to 
be the most risky and to carry to highest likelihood of actors turning back. 
During the conversion from conventional to organic farming, yields can drop, 
sometimes drastically, and oftentimes restoration health and biological activity 
to the soil takes many years. Conversion not only requires desistence from the 
use of agrochemicals, but also the neutralization of chemical residues left in the 
soil.  
 While conventional tea market prices remain relatively stable due to both 
a balanced supply and demand and to tea corporations such as Lipton, Lyons, 
Tetley and Premier Brands holding monopolistic price control (90% of Western 
trade is in the hands of seven transnational companies), the market for organic 
tea is characterized by large fluctuations. (Hazra 2006) This is expected to be 
both because of the large number of conversions to organic production each 
year, making the increase of supply well above the increase in demand, and 
inconsistency of different trends within the niche market of organic tea. 
However, in some European countries sales growth in organic food and 
beverages has been as high as 85% in the last decade. (Hazra 2006) The United 
States has the largest market for organic goods, followed by Germany, France, 
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the United Kingdom, and Japan. India and Sri Lanka lead in organic black tea 
production. (Hazra 2006) 
 Considering the development possibilities of such methods of alternate 
trade must also include monitoring the effects that occur within the population 
producing said goods. As seen in some of the negative effects of fair trade 
production occurring within different primary production sectors, alternative 
trade has the ability to work as a regime upholding a certain idea or expectation 
but creating confusion and difficulty with strict, not always appropriate cross-
product rules. Radio Canada International’s The Link broadcasted a brief account 
of Sarah Mohan’s research on tea farming in Eastern Nepal in 2010. As an intern 
for Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Mohan studied 
challenges for small-holder tea farmers who were being encouraged to go organic 
in order to fit into a higher price niche in the western export market. She found 
that tea farmers who were receiving certifications as organic or other quality 
standards to compete in the international market were not receiving a higher 
profit than those who were not exporting their tea, and that the small-scale 
farmers were buckling under international rules and earning less profits. 
 
Methodology 
 This research was conducted through interviews and observations in the 
Ilam district and the Kathmandu Valley of Nepal. The core of the research took 
place in the Sundarpani region of the district of Ilam and included a collection of 
interviews with tea farmers in this area as well as interviews with factory staff 
and observations of interactions between factory staff and farmers. Further, brief 
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interviews with tea pickers in this area helped broaden the scope of the research 
and interviews with NGO managers in Kathmandu provided necessary 
background information and broader information of the Nepali tea sector. 
I decided to focus my research on the farmers in sublicense relationships 
Gorkha Tea Estate in Sundarpani to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
particular relationship between this estate and its member farmers rather than 
travel to several estates and compromise my limited time. I had originally 
planned to, after some observation and introduction to the community, conduct 
my interviews at the factory itself as farmers bring their green leaf to the factory. 
This would also have allowed me to interview on a relatively random basis and 
negated the need for assistance in finding farmers houses. However, immediately 
after I had finished my initial observations, the tea factory workers of the Ilam 
district called a bandh (strike), closing down all tea factories in the area for the 
rest of my stay. Therefore, I conducted my interviews by shadowing tea factory 
staff who go on field visits to check on and give technical support to farmers. I 
walked with the staff on these visits and at each house we visited I asked if I 
could conduct an interview. Altogether I interviewed twenty-four farmers and 
pickers. My interview questions were open-ended and I varied which questions I 
asked by the answers I received and by the direction which the interview took. A 
list of interview questions can be found in Appendix C. I received and recorded 
verbal consent from each informant. The verbal consent script can be found in 
Appendix B. The interviews were conducted in Nepali with occasional use of 
English or Yolmo words. They were recorded on a voice recorder and later 
transcribed. I received help from my homestay sister and Nepali language 
instructor in translating some of the more difficult interviews.   
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 I was able to gain some trust and a community presence through semi-
fluency in Nepali and staying with a local family. As the Sundarpani community 
was very small, this meant that I was relatively well-known in the community, 
making my visits to farmer’s houses less confusing or surprising. In conducting 
field interviews I struggled with assuring that my informants felt comfortable 
with honestly answering my questions. As this area is very infrequently visited by 
foreigners, I was a relative oddity in the area and was treated with extreme 
respect and hospitality. I imagine that some informant’s answers were affected by 
my position and their confusion at who I was and why I was there. I attempting to 
combat this confusion by clearly explaining my role as a student researcher who 
was not connected to any government or business institution. I also had some 
difficulty in separating myself from the factory. Due to the factory bandh, in 
order to find farmers who were sublicensees of Gorkha Tea Estate in the relative 
maze of tea fields, I walked with Gorkha Tea Estate staff in their daily work. 
Though this was very convenient, it meant that I was arriving at farmers houses 
with factory staff members and that staff members were present during my 
interviews. Though I assured farmers that my research was independent, this 
factor and its possible input of bias into my data must be considered when 
approaching my findings.  
 As I was in the field, the focus of this research shifted slightly from its 
original construction. I came into the field looking at the rules of organic tea 
production and how those rules affect small-holder farmers, but ended up finding 
the relationship between the farmer and the factory, as affected by the organic 
sublicense relationship, more interesting. As this study question presents more 
risk to informants within this community by possibly affecting the business 
Gardner 12 
 
relationship between the factory and farmers, all farmer or picker names will be 
omitted from this research.  
   
Research Findings 
Sundarpani farmers  
The core field research in this study was conducted through twenty-two 
interviews with tea farmers and two interviews with tea pickers in the Sundarpani 
area of the Ilam district of Eastern Nepal. Each of these interviews took slightly 
different directions and my questions followed the path of each farmer’s answers. 
Therefore the findings from these interviews is highly qualitative rather than 
quantitative. I was more interested in trends in answers and the focuses of each 
farmer than I was in gathering percentages or quantitative data. There were some 
striking trends in the farmers’ and pickers’ answers. Though almost every farmer 
answered in the affirmative to whether or not they like organic agriculture and the 
great majority said that the future for organic tea is good, answers were split 
relatively equally between organic tea being successful or mediocre. When 
asking about the difficulty of organic agriculture, almost every farmer explained 
that it is very difficult and expensive to farm organically. Explanations by 
farmers of what organic agriculture is and why it is used were relatively similar, 
focusing on health, environment, and the market; and a high level of confidence 
was common in explanations of organic agriculture. Several farmers discussed 
the current low price offered for green leaf, explaining that a higher price is 
needed for the farmers to gain a profit. One farmer went on to say that prices 
would be better if more than one factory was buying organic green leaf, and 
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another asked me personally to warn the manager of the factory that this low 
price is going to cause problems.  
 
Technical assistance observations 
 In observing the work of Sapan Rai, a staff member of Gorkha Tea Estate 
who offers farmers technical assistance in organic agriculture and assists in the 
sublicense relationship, I witnessed several conversations about the price offered 
by Gorkha Tea Estate for green leaf. Though each conversation was different, 
many farmers seemed unsatisfied with the current price.  
 
Gorkha Tea Estate staff interviews 
 While in Sundarpani, I conducted several interviews with Gorkha Tea 
Estate staff members, which supplied a thorough understanding of the factory’s 
perceptions and vision of their conversion to organic tea production. Two 
relatively in-depth interviews covered the history and overreaching aims of this 
institution.  
An interview with Gorkha Tea Estate’s organic program coordinator and 
consultant SK Pradhan further helped to illuminate the factory’s perceptions of 
organic tea production. Pradhan explained that the factory is converting to 
organic production because pesticides lower the quality of tea and ruin the 
environment. He also explained that there is high foreign demand for organic 
tea, which puts the tea farmers who produce organically in a better financial 
position than conventional tea farmers. Changes that came with the organic 
conversion mainly include stopping the application of any chemical pesticides 
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and fertilizers. Organic fertilizer has no chemicals, but is animal dung and 
compost. He says that soil fertility is very important but that it has been very 
hard to motivate farmers to go organic, so the factory runs a pesticides 
awareness program which has very slowly raised awareness.(Pradhan 2011) 
Pradhan described success has very much depended on the price, and since the 
factory began the conversion process only four years ago, soil conditions still 
very slowly improving. He stated that the farmers are split evenly on whether or 
not they like organic production and that farmers’ opinions are dependant very 
much on price. For Gorkha Tea Estate, the factory is only in the next month (June 
2011) finally getting their final organic certificate, so the success of organic tea is 
still very much to be seen. Pradhan said that makes organic tea production hard 
is that it is very labor intensive and it is very hard to achieve good quality 
because one cannot rely on chemicals. He described the easy part of organic 
production as not relying on outside products, but the biggest challenge as 
quality. (Pradhan 2011) With organic tea farming one must pluck early, the 
leaves are smaller and harder, and bushes are shorter, making quality tea much 
more difficult to produce. As productivity for each laborer is much lower and 
there is has been a lack of labor in this area, farmers in the area have been 
struggling to produce enough tea. (Pradhan 2011)   
Pradhan hopes that in the future this whole area will be organic and the 
Ilam region, as completely organic and can compete with Darjeeling. If Nepal’s 
tea sector can fill rising demand, which is large and he believes will grow with 
population growth, it will succeed and bring future success. Though Darjeeling 
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is world-famous, Pradhan describes Darjeeling and Ilam tea as almost exactly 
the same, the main difference being that Nepal’s tea market is not well 
established. He believes Nepal Tea market will only succeed if quality is 
consistent and all tea produced is organic. (Pradhan 2011) 
 Udaya Chapagain is the directing manager of Gorkha Tea Estate. He is 
also the founder and past president of HIMCOOP and the current president of 
HOTPA (Himalayan Orthodox Tea Producers’ Association). Interviewing 
Chapagain brought to light the public face of Gorkha Tea Estate, and its vision. 
Chapagain explained the conversion to organic as being, at its core, for the 
prosperity of the tea farmers. He emphasized that his work with, and the 
creation of the Public Private Partnership (PPP), which is a coordination of 
efforts by Gorkha Tea Estate, GIZ, and Tee Schwender, promotes farmers so that 
Gorkha Tea Estate can ask more money from consumer and that money can go 
directly back to the farmers. (Chapagain 2011) Chapagain described the decision 
to go organic as a process of agreements which occurred between Gorkha Tea 
Estate’s and its cooperatives and between the cooperatives and their farmers. 
Since there are specific rules and regulations for organic certification, Gorkha 
Tea Estate gives training on how to maintain pruning cycle, recording keeping, 
and composting. (Chapagain 2011) Chapagain explained that though farmers 
cannot change cooperatives, converting to organic is a farmer’s personal choice. 
For instance in Sundarpani only around 60 of over 100 farmers decided to 
convert to organic production. HIMCOOP is not involved in organic, only 
involved in marketing Nepal Tea, but HOTPA worked on Code of Conduct 
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(respect to nature, respect to people, respect to culture, and transparency) which 
has now stopped due to lack of funding. Before the funding problem, HOTPA 
was working to educate farmers on issues such as banned pesticides. HOTPA is 
lobbying the government for funding for organic and organizing workshops to 
try to convince government of the benefit of organic. However, results from the 
government sector are very difficult to procure because the Nepali government 
is changing so frequently and political situation is so fragile. (Chapagain 2011)   
In Nepal there are 92 tea factories and only two are certified as organic.  
These factories have been certified as organic by NASAA from Australia but 
Gorkha Tea Estate is working on obtaining organic certification from Institute 
for Marketecology (IMO) as well as NASAA. (Chapagain 2011) The 
requirements for organic certification from IMO can be found in Appendix D. 
Gorkha Tea Estate has been working on conversion since 2007, and Chapagain 
hopes that the factory will be certified by the end of May or early June.  
Chapagain explained that in Darjeeling there are more than 100 factories 
and that he believes almost all will convert to organic within the next couple 
years. The Indian government is heavily supporting the promotion of Darjeeling 
tea and organic conversion, while the Nepali government is not supporting 
organic and most factories in Nepal are not interested in converting to organic 
production. (Chapagain 2011) He expressed his belief that organic tea is good for 
health and environment and has a good market. He sees huge potential, but a lot 
of work and a lot of commitment is needed on many fronts.  
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Further interviews with Sapan Rai and Usha Subba back up assertions of 
the staff’s vision of organic tea as better for health, the environment, and profit. 
The vision of the factory rests on the assumption that the market for organic tea 
will bring more profit to farmers in the long term then the market for 
conventional tea.  
Bandhs 
 While staying in Sundarpani, I had the opportunity to observe a series of 
bandhs (strikes) related to the tea industry. About a week into my stay in 
Sundarpani, Ilam’s tea factory workers called a strike on all tea factories in Ilam, 
asking for higher wages. From the conversations I had and protests I observed, 
the factory bandh most painfully affected tea farmers. If tea bushes get too tall 
and is tea is not picked at the correct time, the tea will not be of good quality and 
the bushes will not produce a second flush (harvest). (Rai, Sapan 2011) This 
means that closing down the factory for a week right in the middle of spring 
flush picking hurts both the tea bushes and the farmers profits. Therefore, in 
protest of the factory bandh, the farmers have called a district-wide bandh, 
closing the roads, business, schools, etc.  If nothing else, this bandh emphasized 
the importance of the factories to the farmers. 
Sunil Rai 
 Finally, an interview is Mr. Sunil Rai, chairman of the Non-
Governmental Organization TeaSec (Tea Sector Service Centre) provided a 
source of overall information on the tea sector in Nepal and its current 
challenges and possibilities. TEASEC is an NGO whose vision is the prosperity 
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of tea farmers in Nepal. (Rai, Sunil 2011) The NGO’s main objective is the 
reduction of poverty though technical training and organizational support (on 
every level from local community to national). Over 90% of Nepal’s tea 
production is grown by small farmers. Some small holder farmers self-process, 
but most sell to factories. (Rai, Sunil 2011) Rai described the biggest problems in 
the Nepali tea sector as the difficulty in obtaining pesticides that are not banned, 
lack of cheap or easy organic input, lack of support from government, lack of 
available loans to farmers, and lack of infrastructure which keeps 20% of farmers 
from selling their product.  
Rai expressed his belief in a bright future for tea in Nepal. In eastern 
Nepal, almost all agriculture is ginger, cardamom, and tea. Cardamom has been 
severely affected by a virus, and ginger is affected by both a virus and a heavily 
fluctuating market. While these two crops seem to be dying out, tea is a hardy  
plant (Ilam’s bushes have survived for 148 years) and tea has a strong, consistent 
market. (Rai, Sunil 2011) Nepal tea is the same as Darjeeling, and consumers are 
starting to look for alternatives to Darjeeling, so Nepal has encouraging 
possibilities.  Nepal’s tea is slowly developing as a known brand and building a 
stronger demand. 
When considering the institution of the factory in Nepal’s tea production, 
Rai explained that the price which factories offer for green leaf is a major criteria 
in a farmer’s choice of to which factory to sell their green leaf. More and more 
factories are beginning to have year-long contracts which fix the price for each 
flush. Many farmers prefer this system because without a fixed price farmers 
Gardner 19 
 
sometimes get cheated in the later flushes of the year. With fixed prices farmers 
are safe from extreme fluctuations. (Rai, Sunil 2011) Rai explained that it is best 
for farmers to sell through cooperatives for several reasons. Cooperatives hold 
better bargaining power, cooperatives provide a form of connection and 
support, and the government sector, NGO, and factory supports always go 
through cooperatives. In bargaining with factories, cooperatives fix the price 
with the factory, which is then given to every member of the cooperative. 
Normally farmers do not change factories but bargain instead, especially for 
they are producing organically or are in some other sublicense arrangement. 
(Rai, Sunil 2011) Right now organic is a niche market so Rai explained that the 
future cannot be easily predicted, but high quality tea definitely will always 
have a good market. Some conventional but very high quality teas give higher 
prices for green leaf than organic factories. Rai stated that sublicensing can be 
good for farmers if factory is sincere, but if there is cartel or factories do not offer 
fair price, sublicense agreements can trap farmers. Though these agreements are 
not legally binding and technically farmer can leave at any time, a long of 
investment is involved on the part of the farmer, and it is expected that contracts 
will be upheld. (Rai, Sunil 2011) 
 
Discussion/Analysis 
 From my interviews and observations of Gorkha Tea Estate’s conversion 
from conventional to organic tea production, I have found that under this 
particular form of sublicense relationship there is a clear alteration in the power 
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dynamics between the tea factory and the tea farmers. In light of my research 
findings, I would argue that tea factories, as they exist in eastern Nepal, act as 
efficient and equilibrium-increasing middlemen, sustaining the existence of small 
holder, export tea farmers by providing market access as well as acting as market 
experts, thus guaranteeing a quality product to consumers. However, I also argue 
that Gorkha Tea Estate’s conversion to organic production and the necessary 
sublicensing of farmers as part of this conversion decreases competition in the 
purchase of green leaf, presenting Gorkha Tea Estate with monopsonistic market 
power and lessening farmers’ bargaining power. When discussing monopsony I 
am referring to a market with several sellers and only one buyer. 
 The identity of the factory as an expert middleman increasing both market 
access for farmers and quality assurance for consumers is indicated by several 
factors of my research findings including interviews with farmers and pickers, 
interviews with factory staff and other tea sector experts, and observations of the 
farmers’ bandh. The factory, as a constant and long term tea purchaser, has the 
incentive to become an expert on detecting quality of tea and, in order to sell high 
quality tea and sustain a positive reputation, provide assistance to its farmers in 
producing high quality tea. In interviews with farmers and pickers, the 
overwhelming majority of informants showed marked confidence in discussing 
technique and benefits of organic farming, sometimes even referencing Gorkha 
Tea Estate and the trainings they received from the factory on their farming. This 
indicated relative success in the increase of technical knowledge originating from 
the tea factory, which in turn increases the quality of the tea produced. I was also 
able to observe, in my shadowing of Sapan Rai, a great deal of quality monitoring 
by the factory. As Sapan visited the tea farms he not only gave instruction but 
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inspected the farming that was occurring and discussed with farmers any changes 
that needed to be made in their methods to increase production quality to the 
factory’s expected level. Thus the factory decreases asymmetrical information 
between the consumer and producer through expert monitoring. 
The factory’s ability increase market access and sustain the existence of 
small-holder export tea farmers within this area is shown by the purported lack of 
tea farmers who self-process as well as the very system of small-holder farmer 
production in this region, as contrasted with the predominant plantation systems 
of Darjeeling or the Terai (southern flatlands of Nepal). Further, the competition 
shown in price offered for green leaf and systems of bargaining by cooperatives 
as described by Sunil Rai emphasize the functioning of the competitive market 
mechanisms in this system and the relatively strong bargaining power of farmers.  
In addition, observations of the district-wide bandh called by tea farmers 
in response to the tea factory bandh showed that the factories clearly hold a 
strong position as the vehicle with which farmers access the export market. The 
protests held by farmers speaking against the factory bandh emphasized the 
factory’s integral place in the farmers’ production process and the factories’ role 
as sustaining the small-holder tea farmers of this area.  
Given identity of factories in this region as efficient, expert middlemen, 
the conclusion that the conversion to organic production is creating a monospony 
due to a lack of competition among buyers of organic green leaf is indicated by 
interviews with farmers as well as observations of conversations between farmers 
and factory staff in Sundarpani. As explained by Sunil Rai, a sublicense in such a 
situation as a factory’s conversion to organic production is necessary because for 
the factory’s product to be certified as organic, the product must conform to 
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certain standards throughout every step of its production. (2011) The farmers 
who are in a sublicense relationship with Gorkha Tea Estate are a critical part of 
the IMO certification of the final organic tea that is sold. However, as shown by 
farmers’ responses to interviews as well as descriptions of organic farming by 
factory staff, organic production involves a high level of investment and is much 
more difficult than conventional tea farming. Therefore, though farmers receive a 
higher price for their green leaf from Gorkha Tea Estate than they would from 
conventional factories, the organic farmers’ input prices are higher so profits may 
not necessarily be higher under organic production. The farmer, as a sublicensee 
of the only organic factory in this specific area can only sells his green leaf to this 
specific factory. Though a similar situation exists in the year-long contracts that 
are becoming increasingly used between factories and farmers, the conversion of 
a specific farmer to organic farming is a longer-term and larger investment, 
somewhat tying the farmer to the factory as the farmer’s higher input costs make 
the farmer unable to make a profit by selling to other, conventional, factories in 
the area. So though the sublicense is not a binding legal contract and the farmer 
can decide to switch back to conventional farming at any time, the farmer is 
unlikely to do this after putting such a high investment into the hope of higher 
future profits from organic production. The farmer is investing in organic 
production on the factory’s promise that the farmer will profit in the future and 
without any other factory to sell to if Gorkha Tea Estate drops its prices offer or 
does not increase its price offer at the rate it advertizes before the conversion. The 
farmer, is therefore trapped in a monopsonistic system of a micro-market with 
only one buyer and no competition between the buyers.  
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As the abuse of monopsonistic market power cannot be proven in this 
situation, and I am arguing that the conversion to organic is increasing a factory’s 
bargaining power through monopsonistic market influence but not necessarily 
attempting to prove any effects of this increase in bargaining power. Though I do 
not argue that Gorkha Tea Estate is using this market influence to gain positive 
economic profits, the conceptual conclusion of the factories higher bargaining 
power was supported by farmers expressions of dissatisfaction with Gorkha Tea 
Estate’s current price offer in interviews as well as in observations of 
conversations between factory staff and farmers. 
 
Conclusion: 
 In explaining why he could not raise Gorkha Tea Estate’s price offer for 
green leaf to the level for which a cooperative leader was bargaining, a factory 
administrator told me that Gorkha Tea Estate was his family and that he must 
take care of all of his children. This sentiment holds many layers of symbolism 
for the current power politics involved in Gorkha Tea Estate’s conversion to 
organic production. The sublicensing of farmers under this factory has reverted 
an efficient system of bargaining to a patriarchal, monopsonistic system where 
the factory has much greater bargaining power than any farmer or cooperative. 
As the farmers have invested in converting to organic production, tying 
themselves to this factory for the near future, Gorkha Tea Estate has the ability to 
choose relatively freely both the price and quantity purchased of organic green 
leaf in this area.  
 However, the market is not a static entity and these power dynamics are 
therefore constantly in flux. If, as some predict, the market for organic tea 
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flourishes due to the continued popularity of this alternative trade movement, 
Gorkha Tea Estate will make positive economic profits, causing market entry and 
the conversion of other factories in the area to organic production. This 
conversion will create competition among organic factories, decreasing the 
monopsonistic power of Gorkha Tea Estate and returning bargaining power to the 
farmers. Not only would this revert bargaining between farmers and the Gorkha 
Tea Estate to an efficient system, but the systems of production in this area would 
change in accordance with the philosophy of the organic movement. If, as its 
proponents suggest, organic tea agriculture produces healthier, higher quality tea 
with fewer negative effects on the environment, and the market for organic tea 
continues to grow, the eventual production system in this area would, in fact, be 
an improvement from the current conventional system.  
 Therefore should Gorkha Tea Estate be criticized as a patriarch or praised 
as a impetus for positive change? I argue for neither of these sentiments, but 
instead present the current market reality as snapshot of a market in transition. In 
light of individual agency and market freedom the factory should not hold a 
lasting position as a patriarch with monopsonistic market power. However, the 
only current abilities to check this power can come from cooperatives and NGOs 
who must do all that is in their power to advocate for farmers and the farmers’ 
bargaining position as free agents. Otherwise all that can be hoped for, for the 
sublicensees of Gorkha Tea Estate, is an eventual increase in competition 
resulting from the conversion of other factories in this area to organic production, 
and for the present, the sincerity of Gorkha Tea Estate in its expressions of 






Glossary of Terms  
Adverse selection: buyers and sellers of a product have asymmetrical information  
Agrochemicals: a synthetic compound used in the production of crops (ex. 
Pesticide, chemical fertilizer)  
Bandh: Nepali word for a strike which shuts down a business, roads, or all 
commercial activities in a district 
Cartel: a coordination between independent actors to limit market competition, 
therefore controlling price and/or quantity supplied or demanded 
CTC: Crush-Tear-Curl style of tea production which produces tea in pellets 
Equilibrium: stable market point where supply and demand have equalized  
Flush: season of harvest 
GIZ: The Inclusive Development of the Economy Programme (Dutch NGO) 
Green leaf: picked tea leaves before processing 
HIMCOOP: Himalayan Tea Producers Cooperative Limited  
HOTPA: Himalayan Orthodox Tea Producers’ Association  
IFOAM: International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
IMO: Institute for Marketecology 
Monopsony: a market with several sellers but only one buyer  
NASAA: The National Association for Sustainable Agriculture, Australia 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization 
Orthodox: old style of producing tea which leaves tea leaves whole  
PPP: Public Private Partnership (coordination between Gorkha Tea Estate, GIZ, 
and Tee Schwender) 
Small-holder: owner of a relatively small amount of agricultural land 
Sublicense: a license giving rights of production to a person or company that is 
not the primary holder of such rights  
TEASEC: Tea Sector Service Centre, Nepal 
Terai: southern belt of flatlands in Nepal 










The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) 
defines the objectives of organic farming to be: 
• Produce food and beverages of high nutritional quality in sufficient 
quantity 
• Work with natural systems rather than seeking to dominate them 
• Encourage and enhance biological cycles within the farming system; 
involving micro-organisms, soil flora and fauna, plants, and animals 
• Maintain and increase the long-term fertility of soils 
• Use as far as possible renewable on-farm resources in locally organized 
agriculture systems 
• Work as much as possible within a closed system with regards to organic 
matter and nutrient elements 
• Give all livestock conditions of life that allow them to perform all aspects 
of their innate behavior 
• Avoid all forms of pollution that may result from agricultural techniques 
• Maintain the genetic diversity of the agricultural system and its 
surroundings, including the protection of plant and wildlife habitats 
• Allow agricultural producers an adequate return and satisfaction from 
their work including a safe working environment 






Appendix B:  
 
Introduction and verbal consent script (translated into English): 
My name is Kamala and I am an American student. I came to Nepal two months 
ago and I am studying Nepali language, culture, and development. Right now, I 
am doing research for school on organic tea agriculture in this region. Can I ask 
you some questions? 
(if yes) 
At anytime you may end this interview or not answer any question. Absolutely 











Interview questions for farmers and pickers (translated into English): 
1. What is your work? 
2. When did you begin to convert to organic production? 
3. What is organic tea agriculture? How is it different from conventional tea 
agriculture? 
4. For tea agriculture, why organic?  
5. Do you like organic agriculture? Why or why not? 
6. For you, has organic tea agriculture been successful? Why or why not? 









Certification requirements for organic certification by IMO: 
 
Smallholder farmers (farmers associations/cooperatives  or processors with 
contracted smallholder farmers) may be certified as a group under the following 
conditions: 
- common marketing of the produce as a group 
- homogeneity of members in terms of location, production system, products 
- the group has an Internal Control System 
 
The EU additionally restricts smallholder groups certification (with reduced 
external control) to developing countries only. 
 
The requirements for a formal Internal Control System that allows IMO to 
delegate the inspection of all members to the ICS can be summarized as follows: 
• Has written procedures and forms (ICS Manual) 
• Is aware of risks and critical control points 
• Has an internal organic standard, i.e a summary /interpretation of the 
requirements for organic production that can be understood by farmers 
and ICS staff 
• The ICS carries out internal inspections of all farmers in the group 
• Has documented effective procedures for internal farm inspection, 
internal approval and dealing with non-compliances 
• The ICS has qualified personnel and a clear structure 
• The group ensures training of farmers as well as of ICS staff 
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